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I. INTRODUCTION
No longer is it true that a woman who gives birth to a child is that
child’s biological mother. The biological mother may well be standing at
the side of the woman as she gives birth, coaching her lesbian partner
through the birth of their first child. In another hospital room, twin boys
born to a woman may be half-brothers, but not her sons. Instead, the two
men standing just outside the birthing room--a gay couple--are each the
biological father to one of the boys, but the children share a common biological mother who remains an anonymous egg donor in a gestational surrogacy arrangement. The medical wonders described above are the result

*
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Esq., whose daily grind in fashioning family creation and protection in South Florida will provide continuing grist for my intellectual mill.
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of readily accessible scientific reproductive technologies that continue to
1
evolve.
Over the past twenty years, these reproductive techniques have not
only become more accessible, they are also increasingly used by unmarried
persons and couples to create families that do not conform to society’s tra2
ditional and legal conceptions of “family.” The nuclear family of two,
opposite-sex parents, and their shared biological offspring has been joined
3
by families headed by same-sex couples or single parents. These scientifically-spawned, non-traditional families emerged in the wake of a national
transformation in divorce laws and a relatively rapid evolution in gender
expectations with respect to work and home, trends that began in the
4
1960s. Data from the 2000 Census indicates a continuing decline in the
proportion of American households headed by opposite-sex married couples
and a corresponding growth in households headed by single women or men,
5
and unmarried couples. Buried in these statistical trends is a growing
awareness of a “gayby” boom, an era in which gay men and lesbians, both
as individuals and as couples, are increasingly choosing to become parents
6
and establish families of their own. Scientific developments in reproductive technologies ranging from sperm banks and artificial insemination to in
1
Consider, for example, the development of tri-gametic in-vitro fertilization where the only
genetic material used in conception is obtained from the eggs of two different women. The DNA from
the non-gestational woman is removed from her egg and placed in a sperm casing, which has been
stripped of its donor’s DNA. The reconstituted “sperm” is then used to fertilize the gestational mother’s
egg. Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implication of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 433-34, n. 11 (1999). There may be some legal
limits to some reproductive techniques that do not use a sperm cell. Michelle M. Hausmann, Surrogacy
and Related Matters, in ADOPTION, PATERNITY, AND OTHER FLORIDA FAMILY PRACTICE §9.19 (The
Florida Bar, 2007).
2
See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
911, 912 (1996) (discussing various reproductive techniques).
3
Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1331 (1997) (defining the nuclear family).
4
See generally LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MARY LOUISE FELLOWS
& THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 1-4 (4th ed. 2006).
5
Tavia Simmons & Martin O’Connell, U.S. Census Bureau, Married-Couple and UnmarriedPartner Households: 2000, (No. CENSR-5) 3 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. See also T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L.
REV. 55, 57-59 (2004) (reporting additional census data on unmarried couples).
6
The earliest use of the term, “gayby boom,” may have appeared in Eloise Salholz et al., The
Future of Gay America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 20. See Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right To
Wrong: A Critique Of The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 209-15 (2007),
and Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy And One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity For
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 342 (2002) for statistical references on the
gayby boom. While there is no certainty in the numbers of gay men and lesbians raising children, there
is consensus that the numbers are increasing. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate
Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561-63 nn.2-7 (2005) (suggesting that statistics offered by proponents of lesbigay adoptions are inflated while acknowledging dramatic increases in
numbers).
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vitro fertilization and gestational surrogacy are making “lesbigay” family
creation even easier.
Innovation in family creation may have roots in science, but the implications for law are especially significant when one recognizes the importance that family plays in the American legal landscape. The right to “establish a home and bring up children” has long been posited as a liberty
afforded to individuals by the U.S. Constitution under the Fifth and Four7
teenth Amendments. The concept of “family” underpins our legal notions
8
9
10
of privacy, property, and inheritance. In many states, the law has slowly
evolved to embrace the modernization of the American family that has resulted from both the societal changes in family relationships as well as ad11
vances in science. However, some states continue to resist legal recognition of non-traditional families by either limiting or simply barring a range
12
of family arrangements.
Florida is one state that has made family creation particularly difficult
for gay men and lesbians. In 1977, the state statutorily banned adoptions by

7
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (finding that liberty encompasses the right to
marry, establish a home and bring up children); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(finding parental liberty violated by state law mandating public school attendance). But see Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that familial rights
only accrue to legally-recognized families).
8
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a right to privacy
in marital reproductive decisions).
9
See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE F. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 34111 (3d ed. 2005).
10 Consider the range of state laws providing for spousal elections against a will, rights of heirs
under intestacy statutes, and homestead provisions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (2006) (granting
surviving spouse elective share of decedent’s estate); FLA. STAT. § 732.102-103 (2006) (granting spouse
and heirs intestate share of estate); and FLA. STAT. § 732.401-403 (2006) (providing spouse and lineal
descendants protections of homestead property).
11 See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 571 (Cal. 2003); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and
E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); and Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (recognizing second-parent adoptions in cases of lesbian couples using artificial insemination); and In re Jacob,
660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing second-parent adoptions by unmarried partners of biological
mothers in two cases, one a same-sex partner where child was conceived using artificial insemination,
and an opposite-sex partner where the child was conceived in previous marriage and biological father
consented to the adoption).
12 Examples abound. Consider the various bans on civil unions and same-sex marriages found in
state constitutions and state statutes, and in some cases, further language that limits certain rights only to
married couples. There are also restrictions on who may adopt and foster parent, limitations on visitation orders, child custody awards, and the regulation or outright prohibition of surrogacy agreements.
Current data on these policies are readily available from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
Research & Reports, http://www.thetaskforce.org/ reports_and_research.
In 1996, the national government weighed in on family issues by adopting the Defense of Marriage
Act, which limits the federal government’s recognition of marriage to a “legal union” between a man
and a woman as husband and wife, and permits states to deny recognition of marriages performed legally in other states between same-sex couples. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
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13

“homosexuals,” and despite numerous legal challenges, the ban remains in
14
force. This Comment explores how gay men and lesbians in Florida have
managed to build their families despite the ban, and considers the implications of these new family structures for Florida’s laws and public policies.
Following a review of the historical events leading up to Florida’s ban on
adoptions by homosexuals and subsequent efforts to overturn it, legal avenues of family creation available to lesbigay parents in Florida are described. Potential legal challenges are explored and discussed, drawing on
litigation in Florida, other states, and federal courts. Pending legislation
and avenues for policy change are also considered.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Florida’s statutory ban on adoptions by “homosexuals” has its roots in
the backlash to what has been described as the third wave of the American
15
gay liberation movement. In the wake of the Stonewall riots of 1969, gay
and lesbian interest groups formed in major cities across the country to
16
work for legal and political change. High on their agenda was ending

13 “Homosexual” is the term employed in the statute, however, the statute failed to define “homosexual.” FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006). As a result, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a conductbased definition, rather than an orientation or identity characterization of “homosexual.” See infra text
accompanying notes 60-89.
14 See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004);
Florida Dep’t. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla, 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Seebol
v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991), reprinted in Florida Dep’t of Health &
Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1221-29. No other state has an outright ban on adoptions by homosexual persons. Mississippi bars adoption by couples of the same gender, but would permit an adoption
by a single homosexual. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-3(5). Alabama’s legislature adopted a joint resolution to express its intent, “to prohibit child adoption by homosexual couples.” See Code Commissioner’s Notes, ALA. CODE § 26-10A-6 (2006), citing Act 98-439 (HJR 35). Utah bans adoptions by a
person who is “cohabiting” with another in a non-marital, sexual relationship, but would apparently not
bar an adoption by a non-cohabitating, single homosexual. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2006).
Michigan, which permits adoption by one member of a same-sex couple, will not permit adoptions by a
same-sex couple legally married in another state. Mich. Op. Att’y. Gen. 7160 (2004), 2004 WL
2096457. In 1995, Nebraska’s Department of Social Services barred adoption by individuals “who are
known by the agency to be homosexual or who are unmarried and living with another adult” by policy
directive. Memorandum from Director, Nebraska Department of Social Services on Placement in Foster
Care to District and Division Administrators, #1-95 (January 23, 1995), available at
http://www.hhs.state.ne.us/jus/memos/ AM-1.pdf.
15 The gay and lesbian movement has been described in three eras. The first period, homosexual
emancipation, began in the 1890s and lasted until World War II. The second period, marking the homophile movement, followed the war through the Stonewall Riots of 1969. The modern era of gay and
lesbian liberation began in the 1970s and continues today. MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY AND
LESBIAN MOVEMENT 63 (1992). On the backlash effect, see JAMES W. BUTTON, BARBARA A. RIENZ
AND KENNETH WALK, PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC CONFLICTS 68-69 (1997).
16 The Stonewall Riots occurred in New York City at the Stonewall Bar when police officers
attempted to conduct a vice operation, a form of harassment employed against cross-dressers and gay
men. The violence and civil disobedience that resulted lasted several days, and marked the beginning of
the modern gay liberation era. See CRUIKSHANK, supra note 15, at 63.
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discrimination, and gay activists saw some early successes. In South Florida, activists organized and effectively persuaded the Dade County (now,
Miami-Dade) Commission to adopt a human rights ordinance that would
have outlawed discrimination in areas like employment, housing, and pri18
vate education. Although passed by a 5-3 vote on January 19, 1977, a
petition drive led by entertainer Anita Bryant secured sufficient signatures
to force the commission to either repeal the ordinance itself or submit it to
19
the electorate for a referendum vote. In April, the commission voted to
20
put the issue to the voters at a special election in June of that year. A bitter, and at times, violent campaign resulted in the repeal of the ordinance by
21
better than a two-to-one margin.
Despite its local character, the petition drive and high-profile campaign merited state-wide and national attention. Then-governor Reuben
22
Askew spoke out against the ordinance. In the state legislature, Senator
23
Alan Trask from Winter Haven introduced two bills. One amended the
state’s marriage license laws, requiring that one party be male, and the other
24
party be female. The other added a single sentence to the adoption laws:

17 Thirty-six cities had adopted non-discrimination ordinances by early 1977. Adon Taft and
Susan Burnside, Group Opposes Proposed Metro Law: Gay Anti-Bias Bill Criticized, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 17, 1977, at B1.
18 Theodore Stanger, Dade Approves Ordinance Banning Bias Against Gays, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 19, 1977, at A1.
19 John Arnold, Ruvin Swing Vote May Throw Gay-Rights Issue to Voters, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
17, 1977, at A1.
20 John Arnold, Dade Will be Gay-Rights Battlefield, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 20, 1977, at A1.
21 Allan H. Terl, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida, 24 NOVA L. REV.
793, 805 (2000). Some 21 years later, in 1998, Miami-Dade County finally adopted a Human Rights
Ordinance that bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, real or perceived, in housing,
finance, employment and public accommodations. Miami-Dade County Ord. No. 98-170, § 1, Dec. 1,
1998, codified at Chap. 11A, Art. 1, § 11A-1 (2007), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/
gateway.asp?pid=10620&sid=9.
22 Robert Hooker, Askew Would Vote ‘No’ on Gay Rights: Miami Gays Seethe, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 17, 1977, at D2.
23 Democrat, Winter Haven. Terl, supra note 21, at 806.
24 Ch. 77-139, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 465 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.07 (1977)). As this Comment is written, Florida faces yet another battle over gay rights. In January 2008, the Secretary of State
certified that the requisite signatures had been gathered through the initiative process to place a constitutional amendment on marriage on the November 2008 ballot. The proposed amendment states, “Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife, no other
legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized."
Cited in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re Florida Marriage Protection Amendment, 926 So.
2d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2006).
If adopted by 60% of the voters, the amendment would effectively impose a constitutional bar on
Florida’s recognition of out-of-state gay marriages and civil unions, would probably undermine domestic partnerships currently recognized in several counties and municipalities across the state, and may
even jeopardize some contractual arrangements between unmarried couples, regardless of whether they
are of opposite sexes or the same sex, according to organizations campaigning against the amendment.
See, e.g., SAVE-Dade, Marriage Amendment,http://savedade.readyhosting.com/marriage_
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“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt, if that person is a
25
homosexual.” Both bills passed the state legislature and were signed into
26
law by Governor Askew two days after the Dade County referendum vote.
The adoption ban remained settled law in Florida during the 1980s as
the state’s gay community recovered from the Dade referendum fight, focused its attention on the outbreak of AIDS, and sought out allies in its ef27
forts to end discrimination. In 1989, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) of Florida made overturning the adoption ban one of its litigation
priorities and filed the first legal challenge to the law in Monroe County
28
(the Florida Keys). Ed Seebol, a gay man whose application to adopt was
rejected by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services because
he indicated that he was “homosexual,” claimed that the adoption ban was
29
unconstitutional under state law. The State made no appearance to defend
30
against the suit. Seebol and the ACLU prevailed when the court ruled that
the adoption ban violated Seebol’s right to privacy, due process rights, and
equal protection under both the state and national constitutions. Because
the State filed no appeal challenging the trial court’s decision, the statutory
31
ban on gay adoptions effectively had no legal force in Monroe County.
Following this early success, the ACLU filed a second case in Sarasota
County on behalf of two gay men who were denied the opportunity to adopt

amendment.htm; Florida Red and Blue, http://www.floridaredandblue.com/; and Fairness for All
Families-Vote NO Florida, http://www.fairnessforallfamilies.org/.
25 Ch. 77-140, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 466 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (1977)).
26 Id; Ch. 77-139, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 465 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.04(1) (1977)). For
comments by state senators during legislative consideration of § 63.042(3), see Tiffani G. Lee, Case
Note, Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services: A Challenge to Florida’s Homosexual
Adoption Ban, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 151, 154-55 (1996) citing Fla. S. Jour., 1977 Org. Sess. at 370-71.
In 1997, Florida passed legislation that refuses recognition of marriages between persons of the same
sex and “relationships between persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages . . . for any
purpose,” and orders all agencies, and political subdivisions to give no effect to any “public act, record,
or judicial proceeding” of any other political entity “respecting either a marriage or a relationship not
recognized . . . or a claim arising from such a marriage or relationship.” FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2006).
The statute has been sustained in a challenge on federal constitutional grounds. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that statute did not violate the U.S. Constitution under the Full
Faith & Credit, Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges or Immunities, or Commerce Clauses).
27 See, generally, Terl, supra note 21, at 809-21.
28 Terl, supra note 21, at 818, 822.
29 Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991), reprinted in Florida Dep’t
of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1221-29 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
30 Id.
31 Id. Since the Seebol decision, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals declared the Florida statute
constitutional in Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services. As an interesting
aside, the 11th Circuit seemingly glossed over the Seebol outcome even while citing it, stating, “To date,
no attempt to overturn the provision has succeeded.” 358 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2004). Because the
Seebol Court relied on both the Florida Constitution and U.S. Constitution in reaching its privacy, due
process, and equal protections arguments, there may remain a question as to whether the Lofton Court
reversed the Seebol decision.
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32

a special needs child. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled §
63.142(3) void for vagueness and unconstitutional under Florida’s constitu33
tional right to privacy and equal protection. This success was short-lived,
however, as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
appealed the case. In an exhaustive opinion, the Second District Court of
Appeal of Florida reversed the decision on procedural grounds as well as on
the vagueness, privacy, due process and equal protection issues, and re34
manded the case. The ACLU then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,
which granted review in Cox v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabili35
tative Services. In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the district
court’s decision as to the procedural, vagueness, privacy and due process
issues, but ruled that “the record is insufficient to determine that this statute
can be sustained against an attack as to its constitutional validity on the
36
rational-basis standard for equal protection.” It directed a remand on the
37
equal protection issues only. The case ended quietly, however, when the
38
petitioners took a voluntary dismissal.
In 1995, the ACLU moved forward yet a third case that had been filed
39
in 1992, but was stayed pending the outcome in the Cox case. June Amer,
a corrections officer, was not permitted to even apply to adopt a child by
Florida’s Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services because she
40
was a lesbian. The ACLU worked to cure the failings of the Cox case by
building a record that elicited expert testimony from psychologists, pointed
to the inconsistencies in banning homosexuals from adoption but not from
foster parenting and noting the fact that Ms. Amer was already parenting a 6
41
year-old son, all in an effort to undermine the “rational” basis of the law.
Their arguments were not convincing, however, and the trial court sustained
42
the statute.
32 Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1994) (granting review).
36 Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995). See Lee,
supra note 26, (providing insights to legislative history of statute and background to case).
37 Cox, 656 So. 2d at 903.
38 Terl, supra note 21, at 824.
39 Id.
40 Donna Leinwand, Gay Adoption Ban Upheld: Lesbian Loses Her Case Against 1977 State
Law, MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 1997, at B1.
41 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Trial Opens in Challenge to Florida Adoption
Law Barring Lesbian Moms and Gay Dads (May 5, 1997), available at
http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/queerlaw-edit/msg00656.html. Policies of Florida’s Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services to bar unmarried couples and homosexuals from serving as foster
parents were struck down in 1994. Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (finding that the agency had exceeded its delegated rule-making authority).
42 Amer v. Johnson, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 854b (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1997).
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Another challenge to Florida’s ban on gay adoptions was filed in fed43
eral court by the ACLU, and it, too, failed to overturn the statute. In
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, the
11th Circuit Court of Appeals considered the appeal of six plaintiffs who
challenged Florida’s ban on gay adoptions on federal constitutional issues,
44
The three foster parents, one legal
and had lost on summary judgment.
guardian, and two of their minor children (one of the foster children and the
child under guardianship care) made three claims: that the statute violated
their due process rights to familial privacy, intimate association and family
integrity; that their fundamental rights to private sexual intimacy as espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas were
45
violated; and that the statute’s differing treatment of homosexuals under
law was a transgression of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection
46
Clause. The Court denied each of the claims, holding that foster parents
and legal guardians do not enjoy the constitutional rights afforded to legal
parents, and thus, could not claim the rights of family privacy and integrity,
47
and intimate association. Cabining the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence, the Lofton Court also posited that the Supreme Court had not
elevated private adult sexual conduct to a fundamental right, but had merely
48
afforded it more protection under the Constitution. Finally, the 11th Circuit panel applied a rational basis test to evaluate the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims, finding that Florida’s argument that the “best interests of the
child” would be served by placing children in homes with heterosexual
49
parents was not irrational. A motion for an en banc hearing, which was
denied by a divided court (7-5), elicited even more text on the substantive

43

Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp.2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (granting summary judgment to the
State of Florida), aff’d subnom. Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th
Cir. 2004). The original suit also included several other plaintiffs who were dismissed earlier for lack of
standing. Lofton v. Butterworth, 93 F. Supp.2d 1343, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
45 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
46 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809. For analyses and potential applications of the Lofton decision, see,
Elizabeth L. Maurer, Errors that Won’t Happen Twice: A Constitutional Glance at a Proposed Texas
Statute That Will Ban Homosexuals From Foster Parent Eligibility, 5 APPALACHIAN J. L. 171, 181-84
(2006); Christopher D. Jozwiak, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services:
Florida’s Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407 (2005);
and Timothy P. Wasyluka, Homosexuals’ Rights to Adopt After Lofton v. Secretary of Department of
Children and Family Services, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 635 (2004).
47 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809.
48 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815-16 (citing Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion and observation that the
majority had not declared a “fundamental right,” and further noting that the majority had not located the
right “directly in the Constitution, but instead treated it as the by-product of several different constitutional principles and liberty interests”).
49 Id. at 821-26.
44
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50

issues of the case than did the decision itself. A subsequent petition by the
51
plaintiffs for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied.
Litigation over Florida’s adoption ban ceased after the Lofton decision
as advocates for gay families struggled to find other legal vehicles with
which to challenge the law. In late 2008, two cases—one in Monroe
County and the other in Miami-Dade County—challenged the adoption ban
52
successfully. While the State did not defend the constitutionality of the
adoption ban, nor did it appeal that court’s order granting the petition to
adopt in the Monroe County case, the State did make an appearance to de53
fend the adoption ban in the Miami-Dade proceeding.
Grounded on distinctive legal theories, the two cases are factually
similar—prospective fathers sought the adoption of children whom the
State had placed in their care as foster parents and the children had lived
54
with the prospective parent for four or more years. The Monroe County
petitioner grounded his case on two theories accepted by the court: a) the
adoption ban is a “special law,” and as such, violates the Florida Constitu55
tion’s prohibition on special laws “pertaining to . . . adoption of persons”;
and b) the adoption ban is a bill of attainder, prohibited by both the Florida
56
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The court sua sponte also found
that the adoption ban violates the Florida Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine grounded in Article II, Section 3, because the legislature had
effectively “displaced the inherent authority and concurrent jurisdiction of
57
the adoption court” to determine the best interests of the child.
The Miami-Dade case, argued by the American Civil Liberties Union,
rested on substantially different grounds. This court held that state and fed58
eral law established a child’s right to a permanent home. The state’s adoption ban violated the children’s right to permanency as well as their liberty
59
interests. Furthermore, the court found that the statute violated Florida’s
constitutional guarantee of equal protection by discriminating against ho-

50 Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (denying
petition for rehearing en banc).
51 Lofton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Children & Families, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005) (denying certiorari).
52 In the Matter of the Adoption of John Doe, 2008 WL 5070056 (16th Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008)
(hereinafter “Monroe County case”); In the Matter of the Adoption of John Doe and James Doe, 2008
WL 5006172 (11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (hereinafter “Miami-Dade County case”).
53 At the time of publication, the State had not indicated whether it intends to appeal the ruling.
54 In the Monroe County case, the petitioner and his partner had previously been named permanent guardians of the child by the court.
55 Art, III, Sec. 11(a)(16) Fla. Const.; Monroe County Case, 2008 WL 5070056.
56 Monroe County Case, 2008 WL 5070056 at 22-27.
57 Id., at 27-33.
58 Miami-Dade County Case, 2008 WL 5006172, 21-25 (relying on Florida Supreme Court decisions, Florida statutes, and the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. § 671)).
59 Id.
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mosexuals and against children who are foster-parented by homosexuals.
Employing a rational basis standard of review, the court rejected each of the
three arguments posited by the State as justifications for the adoption ban:
61
that the ban promotes the well-being of children, minimizes the social
62
stigmatization the children may experience, and promotes public moral63
ity.
These two cases are surely not the final words on Florida’s adoption
ban. Lawyers will continue to consider alternate strategies for creating gay
and lesbian families that work around Florida’s laws, and attempt to effect
policy change through the legislative process by whittling away at the lan64
guage of the adoption statute. But as gay rights organizations achieve
legal successes in other states, strategies for importing those successes into
Florida and Florida law, either directly or indirectly, can serve as vehicles
for the recognition of lesbian and gay family relationships that Florida law
65
persistently refuses to acknowledge.
III. CREATING LESBIGAY FAMILIES IN FLORIDA
The question of “how” to have a legally recognized child is generally
not an issue for married heterosexual couples. In Florida, the child of a
married couple is presumptively assumed to have a mother—the birth
mother—and a father, her husband, and heterosexual families gain legal
66
recognition at their child’s birth. But for gay men and lesbian couples
whose relationships remain legally non-existent in Florida and in most
60

Id., at 25-29.
Id. at 28
62 Id.
63 Id. at 29.
64 A bill that would permit limited adoptions by individuals who are gay or lesbian has been
introduced for consideration during the 2008 Florida Legislative Session. The bill would permit adoptions by gays or lesbians when the child’s parents are deceased, the prospective adoptive parent is the
child’s legal guardian, and the child already resides with the prospective parent. Relating to Adoption,
S.B. 0200 (similar H.B. 0045), 2008 Fla. Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2007). State chapters of national gay rights
organizations and local organizations recognize the importance of educating and reshaping public opinion in Florida, and have mounted campaigns that focus on education and social change. For a discussion of public opinion on Florida’s adoption ban, see Scott D. Ryan, Laura Bedard & Marc Gertz, Florida’s Gay Adoption Ban: What Do Floridians Think?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261 (2004).
65 Consider the implications for Florida of a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, striking down Oklahoma’s Adoption Invalidation Law, and requiring that state to recognize adoption decrees issued by courts outside of Oklahoma even when the adoptive parents are a samesex couple. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
66 “‘Parent’ means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption
of a child would be required under s. 63.062(1). If a child has been legally adopted, the term ‘parent’
means the adoptive mother or father of the child.” FLA. STAT. § 39.01(48) (2006). Florida also defines
“family” as “a collective body of persons, consisting of a child and a parent, legal custodian, or adult
relative, in which: (a) The persons reside in the same house or living unit; or (b) The parent, legal custodian, or adult relative has a legal responsibility by blood, marriage, or court order to support or care for
the child.” FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30) (2006).
61
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states, family creation is the model of family planning and choice. The
first hurdle for them is generally “how” to have a child. While there are
gay men and lesbians who are raising children from previous heterosexual
relationships, for most lesbigay families, family creation in Florida is a twostep process: they must first decide on how to have a child and determine
which adult will be the first parent, and then attempt to gain legal recogni68
tion of the other partner as a second parent. In the balance of this Comment, I focus on the first hurdle for childless gay and lesbian singles and
69
couples in Florida, how to have a child. Depending on the couple’s situation and the law, three avenues of family-building may be available to prospective gay and lesbian parents: single-parent adoptions, artificial insemination, and surrogacy.
A. Single-Parent Adoption
Single-parent adoptions by gay men and lesbians do take place in Flor70
ida despite the statutory ban on adoptions by a “homosexual.” These
adoptions are likely uncontestable in the legal arena for two reasons. First,
the state legislature failed to define “homosexual” in crafting the adoption
statute and courts have relied, instead, on a definition of “homosexual” that
is both narrow and vague. Second, once any adoption is approved, Flor-

67 Some states have legally recognized the relationships of same-sex couples, and have done so
through a variety of arrangements. As of February 2008, Massachusetts was the only state to fully
recognize same-sex marriage. California’s Supreme Court heard consolidated oral arguments on March
4, 2008, in the four cases that grew out of San Francisco’s marriage event in 2003, and the Court is
expected to render a decision on that state’s same-sex marriages within 90 days. In re: Marriage Cases,
149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006) (granting review). Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey and New Hampshire
recognize civil unions, while California and Oregon afford domestic partnerships to same-sex couples.
Maine, Washington and the District of Columbia have limited relationship recognition laws, and Hawaii
allows for reciprocal beneficiaries. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex Couples in the U.S. (February 22, 2008), http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_
research.
Other countries have also accorded legal recognition to same-sex relationships. Marriage, with all
of the rights accorded to a marital couple, is now permitted in five nations: Netherlands (2001), Belgium
(2003), Spain (2005), Canada (2005) and South Africa (2006). Civil unions have a longer history that
date back to Denmark’s recognition in 1989, and in many cases, these national laws provide registered
couples with full family rights, including the right to adopt and co-parent. Norway, Sweden, Iceland and
Finland extend many of the marital benefits to a same-sex couple through civil unions and domestic
partnership recognition.
68 Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples: Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L. Q. 683 (discussing early gay parenting litigation arising from custody
disputes between former different-sex spouses).
69 Subsequent research will examine the second phase of family creation in Florida, specifically,
gaining legal recognition for the second parent.
70 Note that Florida law permits an unmarried or single adult to adopt. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(2)(b)
(2006).
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ida’s statute of repose limits who may challenge an adoption, and estab71
lishes a time limit to those contests.
1. “Homosexual” Defined
The adoption ban statute fails to define “homosexual.” While a judicially-constructed definition has been adopted and is recognized by most
Florida courts, it is conduct-based and casts a narrow category of sexual
acts, it does not encompass sexual orientation, and it leaves an essential
component of the adopted definition unspecified. As a result, gay men and
lesbians can and do, in good faith, deny being “homosexual” under Florida
72
law.
The State of Florida identifies persons ineligible to adopt under the
ban by asking them to self-identify as homosexuals or bisexuals on the
Adoptive Home Application required by the Department of Children and
73
Families for all adoptions. On the application, Item II(G) reads as follows: “Section 63.042(3), F.S., states that ‘no person eligible to adopt under
74
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.” To the right of this
statement are two items, with check-boxes for “Yes” and “No” answers by
the potential adoptive parents (Husband [Man]/Wife [Woman]). The first
seeks a response to the statement, “I am a homosexual.” The second item
75
seeks a response to the statement, “I am bisexual.” The application does
not provide definitions of homosexual or bisexual. In each of the cases that
has been litigated in Florida courts, the petitioners either refused to mark an
76
answer but was known to be homosexual, proffered to the agency in ad71 While there is an on-going debate in the legal academy regarding adoptions by gay, lesbian,
and transgendered persons, this Comment focuses solely on the legal issues involved in lesbigay parenting. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Immorality of Statutory Restrictions on Adoptions by Lesbians and
Gay Men, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379 (2007) (examining the immorality of Florida and Oklahoma’s antigay adoption statutes); Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (2004) (concluding that it is in the best interests of every child to have a
mother and father who are married to each other).
72 Not discussed here, but worthy of recognition, are the personal dilemmas that one confronts in
openly denying their sexual orientation, regardless of an established legal definition. The politics and
personal costs of the closet have been deliberated at length by the gay community. See, e.g., BRUCE
BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE 236-254 (Ann Patty ed., Poseidon Press 1993); MICHAEL WARNER, THE
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (Harv. Univ. Press 1999).
73 Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, Adoptive Home Application, CF-FSP 5071 (03/2007).
74 Id. at 4.
75 The inclusion of the “bisexual” question supports an interpretation of the ban as a conductbased, and not as an identity-based determination. Note that no challenge has been made to the adoption
ban by a bisexual even though it is believed that the incidence of bisexuality is greater than homosexuality. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. R. 353 (2000) (arguing
that despite a greater incidence of bisexuality both homosexuals and heterosexuals benefit from distinct
orientation classifications that exclude bisexuals and bisexuals have contributed to their own erasure).
76 That Steven Lofton, one of the plaintiffs in the only federal case to challenge Florida’s adoption
ban, had refused to answer the homosexuality question on his adoption application became an issue of
contention for the State in its Motion for Final Summary Judgment. The State attempted to argue that
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vance that they were “homosexual,” or marked the “Yes” box on the ap78
plication.
No case has been challenged before the Florida courts where an applicant denied being a “homosexual” or “bisexual,” and the Department of
Children and Families disqualified the applicant on its own finding that the
applicant is, in fact, homosexual or bisexual. A challenge in such a scenario
would force the state to further clarify its definition of “homosexual,” and
require that the state introduce evidence and testimony that goes directly to
the applicant’s conduct and its currency, evidence that is not so easily attained. More importantly, such a challenge would point out the serious
flaws in Florida’s ban on adoptions by homosexuals.
“Who” is a homosexual was one of several issues at the heart of the
79
only adoption ban case to be decided by Florida’s appellate courts. In
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, Florida’s
Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s finding that the
80
adoption-ban provision was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Decided in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, the United States Supreme Court
81
decision that upheld a state’s right to criminalize sodomy, the Cox court
82
grounded its definition of homosexuality in conduct. Because the statute
fails to define “homosexual,” the court agreed to adopt the state’s argument
that Florida should rely on a definition used by New Hampshire, the only
83
other state with a statutory ban on homosexual adoptions at that time.
In New Hampshire, at the urging of its Supreme Court, the state legislature developed a definition of homosexual to be used specifically in the
Lofton, who had been a foster parent for over ten years, was denied permission to adopt because he
failed to submit a complete application. The court rejected that argument, calling it “disingenuous in
light of the explicit language of their Answer and the evidence in the Record.” Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F.
Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2001). The 11th Circuit’s opinion notes further that Lofton had also
refused to disclose “his cohabiting partner” as a member of his household on the adoption application.
Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 808(11th Cir. 2004).
77 See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808 (discussing Plaintiff Houghton’s disqualification due to homosexuality as determined during preliminary home study evaluation).
78 See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808 (discussing Plaintiffs Smith and Skahen having acknowledged that they were gay men on the adoption application).
79 The definition of “homosexual” was first considered in Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab.
Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Upon review, the definition was affirmed
by the Florida Supreme Court. Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1995).
80 The trial court had asked the parties to brief the issue and made this finding despite the fact that
the petitioners acknowledged they were “homosexual” and had not raised arguments of vagueness or
over-breadth in their claim. Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1214.
81 478 U.S. 186 (1986); overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down
Texas state sodomy law in favor of a liberty interest in private, consensual sex between adults).
82 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1213-15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
83 New Hampshire adopted its statutory ban in 1987, and repealed it in 1999. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN § 170-B4 (1988).
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84

context of that state’s adoption ban. A homosexual was “any person who
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one per85
son and the mouth or anus of another person of the same gender.” The
New Hampshire Supreme Court, in reviewing the statute with its amended
language, upheld its constitutionality with two caveats: that the definition
did not intend to encompass coerced acts, and that “the definition's present
tense usage to mean that the acts bringing an individual within the definition's ambit must be or have been committed or submitted to on a current
basis reasonably close in time to the filing of an application for licensure or
86
a petition for adoption.”
In adopting the New Hampshire definition, the Florida court in Cox
noted that the state agency in charge of adoptions submitted that it would
only bar adoptions “when it knows of current, voluntary homosexual activ87
ity by an applicant.” The Cox Court thus found the definition of a homosexual to be reasonable, and that it concerned a person’s conduct and not
88
their thoughts or orientation. Finally, the Cox Court also concluded that
the Florida legislature was not required to use “precise anatomical language
in order for a person of common understanding and intelligence to appreciate that homosexual activity intended by the Florida statute is the same as
89
that described in the New Hampshire statute.” This approach was subse90
quently affirmed on review by the Florida Supreme Court. Five years
84 New Hampshire permits judicial review of legislation prior to enactment at the request of the
legislature. When the New Hampshire legislature first referred the proposed legislation banning homosexual adoptions, the Court “requested to be excused from giving an opinion” until the legislature provided a definition of “homosexual” and provided a “statement of factual findings about the nexus between homosexuality as the legislature would define it and the unfitness of homosexuals as declared by
the bill.” Opinion of the Justices, 522 A.2d 989 (N.H. 1987). Of particular relevance was the court’s
discussion of possible definitions:
While “homosexual” is understood generally to refer to a person who sexually prefers another of his
or her own sex, the court does not know how broadly or narrowly the House of Representatives would
desire that definition to be applied in administering the statute. For example, should “homosexual” be
limited to those currently engaging in physical homosexual practices, should it apply to any person who
has ever at any time engaged in such a practice or could it apply to a person who considers himself or
herself to be a homosexual but who has never performed a homosexual act? Should homosexual practices include any form of sexual contact, as defined in RSA 632-A:1, IV, or should “sexual penetration,”
as defined in RSA 632-A:1, V, be required? Should “homosexual” refer to a bisexual person? 522 A.2d
at 990. The Court subsequently rendered a full review of the proposed statute after the legislature included a definition of “homosexual.” Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987).
85 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-B:2 (1991).
86 Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987). The court further explained, “This
interpretation thus excludes from the definition of homosexual those persons who, for example, had one
homosexual experience during adolescence, but who now engage in exclusively heterosexual behavior.”
Id.
87 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1214-15.
90 Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).
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later, in the only federal challenge to Florida’s adoption ban, the Lofton
plaintiffs failed to challenge the statute as vague or overly broad, a point
91
noted by the District Court in granting summary judgment for the state.
Despite Florida’s adoption of New Hampshire’s statutory language, the
answer to the question of who is a “homosexual” under Florida state law
92
remains a murky one. One point of contention goes to the nature of the
93
sexual activity adopted from the now-repealed New Hampshire law. By
crafting an anatomically-specific statute, the definition fails to recognize a
broad range of sexual activities engaged in by gay men and lesbians that are
94
not included in the New Hampshire criteria. A gay couple could avoid the
classification of “homosexual” by simply not engaging in the specific for95
bidden acts. A second shortcoming of the judicially-constructed definition
is its failure to define what constitutes “current” homosexual activity. In
grappling with this issue in its advisory opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court gave a single example of what it would not consider current
96
homosexual conduct, but that court did not attempt to interpret “currency.”
Is abstinence from engaging in the forbidden acts for a day, a week, a
month, or a year sufficient to overcome the “currency” criteria?
Finally, the state faces a certain difficulty in establishing that an applicant has lied on his or her application, or that the applicant has engaged in
current homosexual activity without the state crossing the threshold of the
applicant’s bed chambers at an indiscrete moment. If an applicant truthfully
denies the “I am a homosexual” query, the agency may have a difficult time
making a determination as to the homosexual conduct of the applicant.
Even if neighbors, friends and colleagues interviewed during the adoption
process all acknowledge that the applicant has a “homosexual orientation,”
none are likely to have the knowledge of explicit sexual practices required
by the definition. The Second District Court of Appeal recognized that it
91

Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
Beyond the scope of this Comment is the scholarly conversation about identity construction
and classificatory authority, especially with respect to race, gender and sexual relationships. By defining homosexuality strictly as conduct, the State may have avoided embroiling itself in the debate over
sexual orientation and homosexual behavior. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 169
(2002) (challenging the traditional legal identity paradigm through gay practices of conversion, passing
and covering); M.C. Mirow, Kennewick Man, Identity, and the Failure of Forensic History, in HISTORY
IN COURT: HISTORICAL EXPERTISE AND METHODS IN A FORENSIC CONTEXT 241, 264 (Alain Wijffels,
ed., Studia Forensia Historica No.3, 2001) (recognizing legislative role in constructing legal identities
even when they are “inconsistent with identities based on other references”); Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 222, 230-38 (1996) (reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES
OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY, (1995)).
93 See supra note 71.
94 This is especially true in an era of “safe sex” where many couples, gay and straight, specifically
avoid the possible exchange of bodily fluids.
95 For example, the use of sex “toys” and manual manipulation between same-sex partners do not
constitute homosexual conduct under the Florida statute.
96 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
92

488

FIU Law Review

[4:473

was working with a narrow definition in its decision in Cox, stating, “We
recognize that a definition of “homosexual,” limited to applicants who are
known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity, draws a distinc97
tion between homosexual orientation and homosexual activity.” It did,
however, signal the legislature that the elected body had the power to ex98
pand the definition “without any mandate from this court.”
While a strict definition of “homosexual” rooted in current conduct
may be recognized and upheld in a judicial arena, what happens “in the
field” at the hands of social workers assigned to conduct home surveys may
result in the application of a definition of “homosexual” that cuts more
closely to homosexual orientation than homosexual conduct. Florida law
requires that a petition to adopt be accompanied by the results of a favor99
able preliminary home study. Conducted by a licensed child-placement
agency, a registered child-care agency, a licensed professional or state
agency, the home study is based on interviews with the prospective parents,
criminal background and abuse registry checks, verification of the adoptive
parents’ financial security, “an assessment of the physical environment of
the home,” and documentation of counseling on the adoption process, adop100
The “Family Safety and Preservative parenting, and support services.
tion Program” of the Department of Children and Family Services requires
that the home study consider a litany of factors including five written recommendations, and it requires prospective parents to sign an affidavit of
101
good moral character, attesting to their own good moral character.
While a prospective gay parent may deny being a current practicing
homosexual, the home study can undoubtedly raise questions in the evaluator’s mind that could result in an unfavorable home study. A single man
who is too effeminate or a woman who is too masculine may be perceived
by the social worker, correctly or even incorrectly, as homosexual. Two
unrelated adult women or men cohabitating may be treated by the reviewing agency as “homosexual,” regardless of the applicant’s negative response
on the application. Or the prospective parent may be asked outright about
97 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). The court also limited its decision to the facts at hand: “We do not need to determine what
steps HRS would be entitled to take in the best interests of children if an applicant declined to answer
these questions.” 627 So. 2d at 1217.
98 Id. at 1215 (stating that the “legislature is constitutionally permitted to reach its own conclusions on the validity of the distinction between homosexual orientation and activity without any mandate
from this court.”)
99 FLA. STAT. § 63.112(2)(B) (2006).
100 FLA. STAT. § 63.092(3) (2006).
101 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 65c-16.005(3)(m) (2003). The affidavit serves as the affiant’s
acknowledgement or denial that the affiant has been found guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere to
a list of criminal charges ranging from murder to child abuse to sexual misconduct. Florida Department
of Children and Families, Affidavit of Good Moral Character, Form 1649 (2007), available at
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/DCFForms/Search/DCFFormSearch.aspx.
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living arrangements. For example, consider the facts in a foster care case
where, during the home study and survey of the placement home, the prospective parent was asked if her female roommate “slept in the same bed102
If the answer is “yes,” the social worker will probably assume
room.”
that they engage in homosexual conduct, even if they do not.
While not rejecting the application on the basis of “homosexual conduct,” agency supervisors may also reject applicants using other grounds as
a cover for their own perception that the applicant meets the state’s definition of homosexual. When this happens, applicants may have little recourse
in appealing the state’s finding. Because adoption in Florida is a statutory
privilege and not a fundamental right, the state enjoys wide discretion in its
placement decisions. Add to this discretion the state’s reliance on determining what is in the best interests of children, and a “very substantial state
interest” is recognized by the courts that may be difficult to rebut by even
103
misidentified heterosexuals.
2. Statute of Repose
A prospective gay or lesbian parent, who in good faith denies current
homosexual conduct and is subsequently approved for a placement, enjoys
the same legal protections following the adoption afforded to other adoptive
parents. Florida law provides all adoptive parents with an assurance that
the court orders establishing their legal status are final one year after the
adoption judgment. State law subjects adoption orders to an independent
104
statute of repose. For gay and lesbian parents, the statute can serve as an
effective legal tool in rebutting future challenges to their adoption orders.
The legislative and legal history of the statute of repose suggests that the
law establishes a fairly substantial bar against any proceedings to unsettle
an adoption order after the one-year period, even if a petitioner alleges
fraud on issues other than the requisite consent to adopt. Moreover, the law

102 When she replied that they did, the Health and Rehabilitative Services official asked her if they
were homosexuals; the prospective parent’s truthful response resulted in an unfavorable home study.
The state statute, however, does not forbid gays and lesbians from becoming foster parents. Matthews v.
Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that state agency had no authority to
establish policy prohibiting homosexual and unmarried persons from being foster parents). Despite
arguments by prospective gay parents that permitting homosexuals to be foster parents while prohibiting
them from being adoptive parents constitutes evidence of an irrational relationship between the statute
and the state’s asserted legitimate interest in protecting children, the federal court found no equal protection violation and found that the foster parent classification was an executive branch consideration, not a
legislative one. Lofton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 823-26 (11th Cir.
2004).
103 Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1216, 1220 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
104 FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (2006) (establishing general statute of limitations); FLA. STAT. § 63.182(1)
(2006) (establishing statute of repose with respect to adoptions).
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imposes strict limits on “who” may challenge adoption orders regardless of
when that challenge is filed.
Historically, Florida courts have reversed adoption orders that were
105
The statute of repose,
gained through fraud on the biological mother.
adopted in a modernization of Florida’s adoption laws in 1973, cured procedural defects and irregularities in adoption orders, and provided that any
“direct or collateral attack” on the validity of the judgment was barred, even
as to the issue of consent to the termination of parental rights, if the matter
106
Courts, howcould have been cured during the adoption proceedings.
ever, read “irregularity” narrowly and continued to permit claims based on
107
fraud to be raised beyond the time limits set by the statute of repose.
In
2000, the legislature revised the statute to specifically address claims based
108
Retaining the one-year limitation for all procedural challenges,
on fraud.
109
it established a new two-year limitation for fraud claims.
In effect, the
statutory revision limited judicial discretion by prohibiting courts from considering stale claims of fraud as grounds for reversing adoption orders.
The most recent amendment to the statute eliminated any mention of
claims based on fraud. Included in the Florida Adoption Act of 2003, the
current statute of repose bars “an action or proceeding of any kind to vacate,
set aside or otherwise nullify” an adoption order filed more than one year
110
after entry of the judgment “on any ground” (emphasis added). However,
this does not foreclose claims by persons whose consent to an adoption are
required by the adoption laws. Under Florida Statute s. 63.082(4)(b)
(2006), a consent “may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress.” Other claims of fraud, however, are barred one
111
year after the execution of the adoption order.
What may be even more important for gay and lesbian families is that
the recent amendment to the statute of repose added a section that limits
who may challenge adoption orders, regardless as to the timing of those

105 See, e.g., In re adoption of Shea, 86 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1956) (affirming existence of fraud sufficient to overturn adoption order); Petition of Gaban, 30 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1947) (finding for natural
mother who signed away rights following childbirth and under effects of anesthesia); Lambert v. Taylor,
8 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1942) (finding for natural mother duped into signing away her rights).
106 FLA. STAT. § 63.182 (1974); 1973 Fla. Laws c. 73-159, § 18.
107 Preston v. Tolone, 661 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (remanding for evidentiary
hearing on fraud claims, which, if substantiated, may result in setting aside of adoption); Peregood v.
Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing M.L.B. v. Dept of Health & Rehabilitative Svcs., 559 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) and finding motion to annul adoption due to fraud
by state agency not barred by statute of repose); but see Calderon v. Torres, 445 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (applying statute of repose to claim of fraud in adoption seven years earlier).
108 2000 Fla. Laws c. 2000-188, § 6.
109 FLA. STAT. § 63.182(2) (2002); 2000 Fla. Laws c. 2000-188, § 6.
110 2003 FLA. LAWS c. 2003-58.
111 Id.
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112

proceedings. A party seeking to challenge a judgment of adoption, other
than those entitled to notice in accordance with the general adoption stat113
ute, must establish an interest that is “direct, financial, and immediate,
and the person must show that he or she will gain or lose by the direct legal
114
operation and effect of the judgment.” An interest that is “indirect, inconsequential or contingent” is not sufficient to establish standing to challenge
115
Thus, challenges by interest groups opposed to gay
an adoption order.
adoptions and disapproving family members who seek to unsettle the adoption should be barred simply because they have no standing.
Problematic, however, is the possibility that a court would permit an
adopted child to challenge her own adoption by and through a guardian ad
litem or “next friend.” Although not arising in the context of gay parents,
such a case was considered in Peregood v. Cosmides, where a two-year old
116
child filed a petition to vacate and rescind a final judgment of adoption.
In this case, the natural parents had entered into a creative legal agreement
whereby the father would be relieved of his child support payments in re117
turn for foregoing future visitation rights with the child.
To effect the
agreement, the natural parents each consented to terminating their parental
rights over their son and making him available for adoption. The mother
118
then adopted her son as sole parent.
Shortly after the adoption was finalized, the deal began to unravel when it became clear that the mother could
not financially sustain herself and the child. As a result, suit was brought in

112

FLA. STAT. § 63.182(2)(a) (2006).
Florida law requires notice to grandparents in some cases where the child has lived with the
grandparent for at least six months within the two-year period preceding a termination of adoption.
FLA. STAT. §63.0425 (2006). Consent to adopt, and thus, notice is also required under FLA. STAT. §
63.062(1) (2006), by:
(a) The mother of the minor.
(b) The father of the minor, if:
1. The minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the mother;
2. The minor is his child by adoption;
3. The minor has been established by court proceeding to be his child;
4. He has filed an affidavit of paternity pursuant to s. 382.013(2)(c); or
5. In the case of an unmarried biological father, he has acknowledged in writing, signed in the
presence of a competent witness, that he is the father of the minor, and has filed such acknowledgement
...
(c) The minor, if 12 years of age or older, unless the court in the best interest of the minor dispenses with the minor’s consent.
(d) Any person lawfully entitled to custody of the minor if required by the court.
(e) The court having jurisdiction to determine custody of the minor, if the person having physical
custody of the minor does not have authority to consent to the adoption.
114 FLA. STAT. § 63.182(2)(a) (2006).
115 Id.
116 Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also In re T.W., 551
So. 2d 1186, 1188 (appointing guardian ad litem for fetus in parental consent abortion case).
117 Id. at 667.
118 Id.
113
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the child’s name against both of his parents, “through his best friend, his
119
maternal grandmother,” challenging the final judgment of adoption.
While the court recognized that the child had standing to challenge his
adoption, it limited its opinion to the “unusual facts surrounding this case,
120
and that this opinion is to be narrowly construed.”
Florida’s ban on homosexual adoptions can be legitimately avoided by
prospective gay and lesbian parents if they understand how the state has
defined “homosexual,” and that the definition is limited to specific acts
engaged in “currently” rather than an orientation or preference. But because the statement that the state asks prospective parents to answer on their
adoption applications is framed so bluntly and fails to provide any definition of “homosexual” or “bisexual,” prospective parents must be counseled
as to the definition, and advised that no court has interpreted what would be
considered “current” homosexual activity. Further legal challenges to the
deceptive wording of the adoption application or a suit where the state has
denied an adoption application based on the adoption ban to a prospective
parent who denied being a homosexual may be the only avenues left in a
future round of legal challenges.
B. Artificial Insemination
Lesbian couples and single women generally enjoy both a biological
and legal advantage over gay men when it comes to family creation in that
they can start their families by artificial insemination. One woman agrees
to serve as the biological and natural mother of the child, and is inseminated
121
with donor sperm. With much planning and a little luck, she will become
pregnant and bear a child who is her natural child. Florida law provides
that “the donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption agreement under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and
122
obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting children.” As a
result, a child conceived by artificial insemination and born to an unmarried
woman will only have its birth mother named on the Florida birth certifi123
cate. This is particularly important to the lesbian couple who may later
119

Id.
Id. at 669.
121 The distinction between a biological and natural mother is an important one in reproductive
technology cases, and is at the heart of surrogacy disputes. The biological parent is one who is genetically related to the child as a result of conception using that person’s egg or sperm. The natural or birth
mother is the woman who physically carries and births the child. In cases of gestational surrogacy, the
birth mother may not be the biological parent. See discussion infra pp. 38-39.
122 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2006).
123 “If the mother is not married at the time of birth, the name of the father may not be entered on
the birth certificate without the execution of an affidavit signed by both the mother and the person to be
named as the father.” FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(c) (2006).
120
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seek to add a second name to the birth certificate of their Florida-born
124
child.
The issue of sperm donation and paternity claims has been addressed
by Florida’s appellate courts. In Lamaritata v. Lucas, a man brought a paternity suit to establish himself as the father of twins born as a result of arti125
ficial insemination. On appeal, the man claimed that he was not a sperm
126
donor under Florida law, and that he and the birth mother were a “com127
missioning couple,” and therefore, he was exempted from the statute.
The court rejected his arguments. While recognizing that “sperm donor” is
not defined in the statute, the court noted that the contract called him a “do128
nor” and “that sperm is the only donation required of him.”
The court
also rejected his suggestion that the birth mother and he constituted a commissioning couple, defined by the statute as “the intended mother and father
of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted technology using the
129
As the couple had
eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.”
only agreed to the donation of sperm for artificial insemination and had not
agreed to jointly raise the children, they did not constitute a commissioning
130
The court ruled that, “[a] person who provides sperm for a
couple.
woman to conceive a child by artificial insemination is not a parent. . . . If
the sperm donor has no parental rights, the sperm donor is a nonparent, a
131
statutory stranger to the children.”
In Budnick v. Silverman, an unmarried woman entered into a “Preconception Agreement” with a man in which they agreed to have intercourse
132
for the purpose of conceiving a child.
The terms of the arrangement
stated that the woman would be sole custodian of the child and pay for all
expenses; she would not identify him as the biological father nor initiate a
133
She further agreed that if she violated the
paternity action against him.
agreement, he could seek “full and complete and permanent custody and
134
guardianship of the child.” A child was conceived as a result of the rela-

124

The potential for legal co-parenting in Florida will be the focus of subsequent research.
Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). For a discussion of the facts
and background to the case, see, L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
126 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2006).
127 Lamaritata, 823 So.2d at 318-19. A “commissioning couple” is language specific to Florida’s
gestational surrogacy laws. See discussion infra at pp. 38-40.
128 Lamaritata, 823 So.2d at 318.
129 FLA. STAT. § 742.13(2) (2006).
130 . Lamaritata, 823 So.2d at 316.
131 Id.
132 Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
133 Id. Under Florida law, any woman who has a child “may bring proceedings . . . to determine
the paternity of a child when paternity has not been established by law or otherwise.” FLA. STAT. §
742.011 (2006). Once identified, the father can be held responsible for child support.
134 Budnick, 805 So. 2d at 1113.
125
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135

tionship. When the child was ten years old, the mother filed a Petition for
Determination of Paternity naming the “donor” man, claiming the agreement was not cognizable under Florida law, and that it was against public
136
policy.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the man, and the
mother appealed. The reviewing court refused to recognize the man as a
sperm donor under Florida law, reasoning that the law was created as part
of a section on “reproductive technology,” and that “[i]mpregnation by the
‘usual and customary manner’ has been around long enough so that it does
137
not constitute ‘reproductive technology.’” In Budnick and in a subsequent
case in Florida, the biological fathers of children conceived through intercourse were ordered to pay retroactive child support as of the child’s
138
birth.
In Florida, the legally-optimal scenario for a lesbian who desires to
become a natural or biological mother is to seek out the services of a medical provider versed in both the medical and legal issues surrounding artifi139
cial insemination.
Whether the sperm used is an anonymous donation
from a bank or from a known contributor like a friend, acquaintance, or
140
relative of the couple, a medical provider can serve as a witness to the
fact that the child was conceived through artificial insemination and not
141
through the “usual and customary manner.”
Working through a sperm
bank or medical provider also reduces the possibility that the resulting
childbirth would be challenged by the sperm donor in a paternity action
because the donor would have completed the requisite forms acknowledg135

Id.
Id.
137 Id. at 1114.
138 Id. Contracts that bargain away a parent’s duty to support their child are against public policy
and void in Florida because the rights to support and to a parental relationship are rights belonging to the
child, not the parent. See, e.g., Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(requiring that father pay retroactive child support for child conceived naturally even when he was
barred from visitation by mother); Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Morley, Jr., 570 So. 2d 402
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (striking down divorce agreement between parents where father terminated his parental rights in exchange for relief from child support). Underlying this approach is the
traditional notion that “it is rarely in a child’s best interests to have fewer adults with duties for the
child’s care.” Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2007) (noting the
countervailing tendency of courts to limit recognition of more than two parents especially with respect
to gay parents).
139 Guaranteeing the health of the donor and the sperm is a medical concern in both anonymous
and known donations.
140 Before sperm banks were widely accessible (especially to unmarried persons), lesbians regularly asked their gay male friends to serve as sperm donors. With the growing acceptance of homosexuality and the resulting transformation in social attitudes, lesbians are also asking their partner’s brothers
or male relatives to serve as sperm donors. Biologically, the child is then genetically related to the
lesbian partner, typically as her niece or nephew if a brother was the donor. P. Baetens and A. Brewaeys, Lesbian Couples Requesting Donor Insemination: An Update of the Knowledge With Regard to
Lesbian Mother Families, 7 HUMAN REPRODUCTION UPDATE 512, 513-14 (2001).
141 Budnick, 805 So. 2d at 1113.
136

2009]

Gay and Lesbian Parenting in Florida

495
142

Some
ing his role only as donor and foregoing any claims to paternity.
lesbian couples opt for nonprofessional (home-based) artificial insemination using the sperm of friends, acquaintances or relatives; however, a contract that has been reviewed by legal counsel is in the best interest of the
143
couple in order to forestall any success by future paternity claims.
While some lesbian couples may choose to engage in natural copulation with a willing man, the cooperating man is not a “sperm donor” under
Florida law, and the lesbian mother runs the risk that the biological father
144
will claim paternity under Florida law. While Florida’s birth registration
laws do not permit a birth mother to identify a father on a child’s birth cer145
tificate if she is unmarried,
the statute does allow unmarried biological
fathers the right to notice, and to consent to adoptions of their offspring if
146
they file with the Florida Putative Father Registry. A paternity claim or
putative father registration can complicate prospective adoption proceedings, whether those proceedings are in Florida or another state. The lesbian
mother will be required to notice the biological father and gain his consent
to any future adoption, requiring that the putative father formally terminate
his parental rights to the child. Thus, prospective lesbian parents should
only opt for artificial insemination, whether the sperm comes from a known
or unknown donor, and should be encouraged to employ the services of a
medical provider who can document that the pregnancy was artificially
induced.
Because gay and lesbian relationships have not been recognized by the
state of Florida, many couples have attempted to rely on the law of con147
tracts to construct family relationships that parallel a heterosexual family.

142 Some lesbian mothers want the biological father to be known to the child and to be a part of the
family. Lesbians may use the sperm of the non-birth mother’s brother or other male relative in order to
form a close genetic bond and legally-cognizable familial relationship between the non-birth parent and
the child. See supra note 128. Naming a father may, however, complicate later efforts to secure secondparent adoptions.
143 A contract provides evidentiary support for a donor arrangement in the event of a paternity
claim. See, e.g., L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Lamaritata v. Lucas,
823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). However, a sperm donor agreement does not govern the
relationship between lesbian co-parents. Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); see also infra text accompanying notes 135-44.
144 “[A] ny man who has reason to believe that he is the father of a child . . . may bring proceedings in circuit court . . . to determine the paternity of the child when paternity has not been established
by law or otherwise.” FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (2006).
145 FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2) (2006).
146 FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2006).
147 The strategy of constructing a legal relationship through support and property agreements,
contracts, wills and health care surrogacy documents has been largely successful for gay and lesbian
couples in areas other than child custody. In Posik v. Layton, a Florida appellate court upheld anterelationship support agreement between a cohabitating lesbian couple, noting that such agreements were
valid between unmarried adults “unless the agreement is inseparably based upon illicit consideration of
sexual services.” 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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This has been especially true with respect to lesbian relationships in which
the couple together decides to engage in family creation using artificial
insemination. However, contractual agreements cannot govern child custody arrangements in Florida. Consider the case where two women, Mary
Wakeman (an attorney) and Dené Dixon, eight years into their relationship,
148
jointly entered into an agreement with a sperm donor. The contract identifies both women as recipient, mother and co-parent, and the donor surrenders all parental rights to the women. The language of the contract suggests
that both women were inseminated. More importantly, it provided that
Wakeman and Dixon intended to co-parent any children resulting from the
insemination, and that should one of them pre-decease the other or become
unable to care for the child, that the child should remain with the other
woman.
Only Dixon became pregnant. Following the child’s birth, the women
entered into an agreement in which they acknowledged that the decision to
have a child was a joint decision, that Wakeman agreed to financially support the child, and that extensively described Wakeman’s relationship with
the child as one of a de facto parent who maintained a psychological parenting relationship with the child. The agreement also foretold of the possibility that the couple would dissolve their relationship at some point in the
future, and expressed their mutual intent to jointly share in raising the child
149
even in that event.
Two years later, Dixon again became pregnant through artificial insemination and using a similar donor agreement. Following that birth, an150
other co-parenting agreement was signed by the women.
In addition to
the agreements, Dixon and Wakeman executed a domestic partnership,
which permitted Wakeman to put Dixon and the two children on her health
151
insurance policy. Wakeman was also designated as the pre-need guardian
of the children, had authority to make medical and dental decisions, and
152
Despite
was the named health care surrogate and attorney for Dixon.
these multiple formal arrangements, when their relationship ended after

148 The decision describes the document between the two women and the sperm donor as an
agreement and not as a contract. Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 670 (2006). It may well be that
the donor received no consideration for his contribution of sperm, and that the term “agreement” is
technically more accurate. However, consideration is unlikely to have any bearing on the legal sufficiency of any agreement regarding parental responsibility and child custody under Florida law. See
discussion supra note 125.
149 Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 670. See also Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (finding that Florida law does not permit non-parents to seek visitation or custody).
150 Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 670.
151 Id. at 670-71.
152 Id. at 670.
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nearly 15 years, Dixon refused to honor any of her commitments and re153
fused to allow Wakeman to share in the children’s lives.
Wakeman’s efforts to enforce the agreements before the Florida courts
failed because Florida’s courts claim not to possess the “authority to compel
154
visitation between a child and a person who is not a parent.” In Beagle v.
Beagle, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that grandparents are third parties
who cannot enjoy child visitation rights with minor children “absent evi155
dence of a demonstrable harm to the child.”
This threshold places an
even greater burden on the non-parental party seeking visitation than the
“best interests of the child.” Because the state may not interfere with the
constitutionally-protected privacy interests of a parent unless it can establish a compelling interest, the non-parental party --be they a grandparent,
relative, or lesbian co-parent -- must show that “a substantial risk of signifi156
cant harm to the child exists.”
This is a nearly-insurmountable burden
that is unlikely to be met when a parent is considered “fit” by even the most
minimal standard; it demands, in essence, a dependency hearing. Thus,
claims by non-parents to being a child’s de facto parent, a co-parent, a psychological parent, and even a claim that the child will be psychologically
damaged by severing ties to the non-parent will fail in Florida courts. Nonparents can only hope that their ex-partner, the child’s biological parent,
157
will honor her agreements and act in the best interests of their children.
The increasing incidences of gay family dissolutions involving children, prompted one judge in the Wakeman case to call on the state legislature to “address the needs of the children born into or raised in these non158
traditional households when a break-up occurs.”
Focusing on the needs
of the children and the growing number of women using assisted reproduction, Judge Van Nortwick argues that the dissolution of a gay family can be
159
just as damaging to a child as the dissolution of a marital relationship.
His petition, however, has fallen on deaf legislative ears.

153

Id. at 671.
Id.
155 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996). The mother and father are assumed to be the first and
second parties.
156 Id. (citing Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991)). Florida’s explicit constitutional guarantee of privacy in Article 1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution
affords its citizens more rights against the state than those privacy rights found in the federal Constitution. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
157 See, e.g., D.E. v. R.D.B., 929 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (denying ex-partner’s
dependency petition claiming children would be psychologically impaired by separation); Kazmierazak
v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (denying psychological parent claim for visitation or custody); Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (denying co-parent
claim based on agreement for visitation or custody).
158 Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 674 (J. Van Nortwick, specially concurring).
159 Id. at 675.
154
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While lesbians enjoy the benefits of a womb and the possibility of carrying their own child to birth, biology has placed gay men at a great disadvantage in parenting as they must rely on the good will of women who are,
first, willing to carry their children through to child birth, and second, to
either surrender the children to the father’s sole custody or share custody of
160
For gay men who live in a state where adoption may be
the children.
foreclosed to them, the services of a surrogate may be the only avenue to
family building.
C. Surrogacy
Surrogacy provides yet another method by which gay men and lesbians may start their families. At its most basic, surrogacy is simply a service
in which a woman agrees to carry a child to term on behalf of someone
161
else. Two types of surrogacy arrangements are possible: traditional and
gestational. In a traditional surrogacy agreement, the birth mother agrees to
be artificially inseminated with the sperm of a man who desires to father a
child. The surrogate provides not only her womb, but also her egg, and is,
thus, biologically related to the child. The surrogate agrees to surrender the
child following its birth to the biological father and to voluntarily terminate
her own parental rights. Gestational surrogacy is quite different in that the
surrogate has no biological connection to the child. The birth mother
agrees to carry to term an embryo that is conceived outside the womb using
the egg of another woman, and to surrender the child following birth to the
contracting parents, who may or may not be related to the child. Gestational surrogacy is the most common surrogacy method employed in the
162
United States today.
Surrogacy came onto the national legal landscape in the late 1980s, in
the case of In re Baby M, a highly-publicized New Jersey case that declared
163
surrogate contracts illegal in that state.
Baby Melissa was conceived and
born as a result of a traditional surrogacy arrangement; the surrogate
mother, a married woman, entered into a contract to be artificially insemi-

160 It seems appropriate to note here the recent announcement of a pregnant “man.” Born a
woman, Thomas Beatie underwent testosterone treatments and some surgical transformations towards
gender reassignment, but did not have his reproductive organs removed. He is recognized as a man
under Oregon law, and is legally married to a woman who is unable to bear children. The pregnancy
was achieved through home-based artificial insemination by donor sperm. Russell Goldman, It’s My
Right, Pregnant Man Tells Oprah, ABCNEWS, Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
story?id=4581943& page=1 (last visited April 6, 2008).
161 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE
FOR PATIENTS 3 (2006), available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/thirdparty.pdf.
162 Id. at 3.
163 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988); see also Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in
Baby Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007) (exploring the personal and
economic interest behind the case).
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nated with sperm from a married man, and agreed to surrender the baby
164
upon birth to the natural father and his wife. When the surrogate refused
to surrender the child to the natural father and his wife and ultimately fled
the state with the child, the case became the focus of national media attention. Apprehended in Florida, the child and surrogate were returned to New
Jersey where a protracted legal battle found its way to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. That court refused to recognize and enforce the surrogacy
agreement, noting that such contracts went against the public policy of the
165
166
state. A mother could not contract away or sell her rights to a child. In
the end, the court took a Solomonic approach, awarding custody of Baby M
to the natural father with visitation by the natural mother, who retained her
167
The intended mother was awarded no legal recognition
parental rights.
168
by the court.
The facts of this particular case prompted state legislatures and national lawmakers to recognize the growing vacuum in reproductive technology policy that was resulting from the increased use of surrogates in
family creation. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) responded to the Baby M case in late 1988, with the
169
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA). The
Act offered state legislatures two options: prohibit surrogacy outright, or
170
While the Act failed to get much
allow it under stringent regulations.
attention from the states, the NCCUSL subsequently included surrogacy in
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 2000, and limited surrogacy arrange171
That restriction was eliminated in the 2002
ments to married couples.
172
revision of the UPA. Today, about one-third of the states have any legislation on surrogacy, and that ranges from outright prohibition to strict regu173
lation.
Florida addressed traditional surrogacy in 1988, calling it “pre-planned
174
adoption” and enacting it within the scope of the state’s adoption statute.
Five years later, in 1993, the state adopted legislation regulating gestational
164

In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
Id. at 1249.
166 Id. at 1242.
167 Id. at 1234-35.
168 Id.
169 Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children From the Marriage Movement: The Case Against
Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 31415 (2006). See also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.htm.
170 Storrow, supra note 169, at 315.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 RICHARD A. LORD, BARGAINS TENDING TO CORRUPTION OR IMMORALITY, 7 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 2007).
174 Fla. Laws 1988, c. 88-143, § 1, codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2006).
165
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175

Provisions for gestational surrogacy appear in Florida’s statsurrogacy.
utes on “Determination of Parentage.” While surrogacy laws have simply
not been litigated in Florida’s courts, there is an open question as to whether
gestational surrogacy, the optimal avenue of reproduction for gay men, is
available to anyone other than married couples in Florida. For gay men,
surrogacy is typically the only means of fathering a child who is genetically
their own. While lesbians might also employ the services of a surrogate, it
is more likely that they would use artificial insemination as a family176
creation strategy, if at all possible.
1. Traditional Surrogacy
Traditional surrogacy is treated under the rubric of pre-planned adoptions in Florida even though no “adoption” actually takes place when the
intended father (gay or heterosexual) is both the sperm donor and biological
177
In a traditional surrogacy, an
father, and there is no “intended mother.”
agreement is crafted between a “volunteer mother” and an intended parent
(or parents), the volunteer is inseminated, and carries the resulting fetus to
birth. Following birth, the surrogate voluntarily terminates her parental
178
Florida law
rights and responsibilities in favor of the intended parent.
requires that these preplanned adoption agreements include specific acknowledgements by the parties that include the statutory requirements that
either party can terminate the agreement at any time, that the “volunteer
mother” has the right to rescind the agreement within 48 hours after birth,
that the “volunteer mother” will assume paternal rights if the agreement is
terminated, and that an intended father, who is also the biological father,
assumes full parental rights for the child even if the agreement is termi179
nated.
That either party can terminate the agreement prior to birth, and
that the surrogate can rescind the agreement up to 48 hours following birth,
imposes a heightened risk for all parties to a pre-planned adoption or traditional surrogacy.
Notably, the pre-planned adoption agreement seems to embrace the
fact that a single person – male or female – can enter into a traditional surrogacy agreement with the volunteer mother. The introductory language
refers to “individuals” entering an agreement, and the definitions include

175

Fla. Laws 1993, c. 93-237. § 2, codified at FLA. STAT. § 742.13-16 (2006).
As discussed below, traditional surrogacy is especially subject to the risk that the birth mother
will opt not to surrender the child. See supra text accompanying notes 165-176.
177 FLA. STAT. § 62.213 (2006).
178 When an intended mother is contemplated by the agreement, the volunteer mother would also
consent to the child’s adoption. FLA. STAT. § 62.213(1)(b) (2006).
179 The statute requires additional acknowledgements related to monetary compensation to the
volunteer mother; her consent to medical care, treatment and adherence to medical instructions; and
issues involving disability or impairment to the child. FLA. STAT. § 62.213(2)(a-i) (2006).
176
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“intended father” and “intended mother” without any indication that there
must be one of each or even that if there is an intended mother and father,
that they be a married couple. Furthermore, the statutory definitions of an
intended father and intended mother specifically note that a biological rela180
Thus, the preplanned adoption
tionship to the child is not required.
agreement could encompass an arrangement wherein a woman agrees to be
artificially inseminated by sperm from an unknown donor, and upon the
child’s birth, voluntarily terminates her parental rights in favor of a single
181
man, a single woman, or a married or unmarried couple.
On its face, the statute permits gay men and lesbians to employ traditional surrogacy as a method of family creation. But preplanned adoption
agreements are not optimal for gay men and lesbians in Florida. First, preplanned adoption arrangements are subject to review and approval by a
182
court, and “compliance with other applicable provisions of law.” In the
case of a preplanned adoption agreement in which the intended parent is not
biologically related to the child, the adoption is clearly subject to the statu183
tory ban on homosexual adoptions.
The statutory language that directly addresses the rights and responsibilities of “the intended father who is also the biological father” suggests
that the preplanned adoption arrangement may be subject to court approval
“pursuant to the Adoption Act,” the Act which also includes the homosexual
184
adoption ban.
However, this provision is directly at odds with Florida
185
law governing unmarried biological fathers and general paternity claims.
A gay man who is biologically related to a child born to a surrogate and
who entered into a preplanned adoption agreement is not “adopting” the
child. In fact, the parentage statute specifically excludes fathers who have
executed a preplanned adoption agreement from the provision that requires
186
sperm donors to relinquish their parental rights and responsibilities.
Given that the intended father is the biological father, entitled to recognition
under Florida law as the father of the child, to refer to court approval and
the Adoption Act appears incongruous. A gay man, biologically the father
of a child born to a surrogate, must merely assert his paternity to be recog-

180

FLA. STAT. § 62.213(6)(d-e) (2006).
Nothing in the language of the statute requires that the intended parents of a preplanned adoption agreement be married. FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2006).
182 FLA. STAT. § 63.213(1)(a) (2006).
183 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006).
184 “That an intended father who is also the biological father acknowledges that he is aware that he
will assume parental rights and responsibilities . . . if the agreement is terminated . . . or if the planned
adoption is not approved by the court pursuant to the Florida Adoption Act.” FLA. STAT. § 63.213(2)(d)
(2006).
185 FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053-054 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (2006).
186 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2006).
181
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nized as a father under Florida law. The ban on homosexual adoptions in
this case has little relevance.
Traditional surrogacy arrangements are typically avoided by the gay
187
The risks involved in a
community for other, more significant reasons.
traditional surrogacy arrangement can be more costly than just the monetary
arrangements outlined in the preplanned adoption agreement, especially to
gay men. Consider a volunteer surrogate who changes her mind and decides to keep the child; she can burden the biological father with child support payments and an unwanted relationship (with the surrogate mother) for
18 or more years. As she is both the birth mother and the biological mother,
her legal rights to the child are on par with those of the biological father,
and given courts’ propensity to award child custody to mothers over fathers,
she may be awarded primary custody.
Because traditional surrogacy is fraught with legal complications
rooted in the biological nexus between the surrogate and child, gestational
surrogacy is a safer alternative for most people seeking to create a family,
188
be they gay, lesbian or heterosexual. This may be true even in the face of
serious legal questions regarding the enforceability of such contracts for
unmarried couples and single persons under Florida law.
2. Gestational Surrogacy
A gestational surrogacy arrangement is one in which the surrogate becomes pregnant through the implantation of an embryo, which resulted
189
from the in vitro fertilization of a donor egg and sperm.
The surrogate
carries and births the child, and then surrenders the child to the contractual
190
The surrogate, as a
parents, who usually have genetic ties to the child.
party to a contract, simply provides a service -- carrying a child through
birth -- to the other contracting party. She has no genetic connection to the
child whom she has birthed. As in traditional surrogacy, Florida law permits the surrogate to be compensated for all “living, legal, medical, psycho191
However,
logical and psychiatric expenses” related to the pregnancy.
unlike traditional surrogacy, the contracting parties do not have a right to
unilaterally terminate their agreement, and custody immediately transfers
187 A pre-planned adoption agreement might, however, provide a fallback position for a gay man
who engages the services of a gestational surrogate in the event of a default. See infra p. 50.
188 Sanger, supra note 163, at n. 56 (reporting that thirty percent of reproductive clinics in the
United States offer only gestational surrogacy).
189 The first successful in vitro fertilization took place in 1944, but embryonic transplantation was
not successful until 1978. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 3 (2006), cited in Sanger, supra note 163, at n. 57. It
should be noted that gestational surrogacies often result in multiple births as practice is to implant several eggs in the hope that one will mature.
190 FLA. STAT. § 742.13(5) (2006).
191 FLA. STAT. § 742.15(4) (2006).
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192

Moreover, an affirmation of parental
from the surrogate upon birth.
status can be obtained from the courts within three days after birth and it
193
The only provision that
does not follow traditional adoption processes.
potentially grants the surrogate parental rights and responsibilities would
come into effect if the child is not genetically related to the intended par194
For these reasons, gestational surrogacy is the optimal of the two
ents.
surrogacy arrangements. One national infertility organization has estimated
195
that 95 percent of all surrogacy contracts today are gestational.
Problematic for gay men and lesbians, however, is that Florida’s gestational surrogacy statute is written such that gestational surrogacy contracts
196
are available only to married couples.
(1) Prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy, a binding and enforceable contract shall be made between the commissioning couple and
the gestational surrogate. A contract for gestational surrogacy shall
not be binding and enforceable unless the gestational surrogate is 18
years of age or older and the commissioning couple are legally mar197
ried and are both 18 years of age or older.
A commissioning couple is defined as the “intended mother and father
of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted reproductive tech198
nology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.”
Additional provisions in the statute require that the commissioning couple
may only enter a gestational surrogacy contract when, “within reasonable
medical certainty” as certified by a physician, the intended mother cannot
carry a child to term, would be at physical risk should she become pregnant,
199
or that a pregnancy would risk the health of the fetus. Because Florida’s
gestational surrogacy statute was enacted in the early 1990s, it has not
benefited from any of the reforms urged by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with the revisions to the Uniform
Parentage Act. Instead, Florida’s statute is rooted in the now-defunct Uni-

192

FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(d-e) (2006).
FLA. STAT. § 742.16(1) (2006).
194 FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(e) (2006). Generally, surrogates contractually agree to refrain from
normal sexual relations during implantation efforts in order to minimize the possibility that the pregnancy and child carried to term is the surrogate’s biological offspring and not the developed implanted
embryo.
195 Sanger, supra note 151, at notes 43, 56 (citing Fact Sheet 56: Surrogacy (Gestational Carrier)
RESOLVE: THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION, at 2 (2004)).
196 For a discussion of the heterosexual-only marriage movement’s influence on both adoption and
assisted reproduction techniques, such as surrogacy, see Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006).
197 FLA. STAT. § 742.14(1) (2006).
198 FLA. STAT. § 742.13(2) (2006).
199 FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2) (2006).
193
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form Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, passed in the wake of
200
the Baby M case.
The Florida statute is textually clear that a contract for gestational surrogacy will not be enforced if a married couple is not a party to it. Thus, a
contract between a surrogate and a single man, a single woman, or an unmarried couple, regardless of sexual orientation, would not be “binding or
enforceable” in a Florida court in the event that one of the parties fails to
perform under the contract. However, there are unmarried Floridians, especially gay men, who have virtually no other avenues for family building,
who are intent on becoming parents, and are willing to risk the unenforceability of a gestational contract to do so. As long as all parties believe the
contract is enforceable and no one defaults, little attention will be given by
a court to the surrogate’s voluntary termination of parental rights, and the
declaration of parentage of the intended father. What a Florida court will
do in the event of a default on a gestational surrogacy contract is the more
interesting legal question.
a. Gestational Surrogacy Contractual Defaults: Whither the Law?
Determining the parentage of a child conceived through gestational
surrogacy when there is a contractual default may, at first glance, look
much like a contractual default over the sale of a car or piece of real estate,
but it is significantly different given the fundamental interests and rights not
only of the contractual parties, but of the child. Declaring a contract void,
ab initio, cannot relieve the court from its duty to resolve disputed parentage issues stemming from a gestational surrogacy. If a gestational surrogate
defaults and the contract is void, the court must fall back on statutory principles of parentage to determine not only the identity of the mother and
father, but to make custody and support decisions. Such a dispute would be
one of first impression in Florida; there are no reported cases involving
201
defaults by gestational surrogates in this state.
The legal issues central to a surrogacy dispute, especially in gestational surrogacy cases, are not the same as those found at the heart of child
202
custody disputes. Custody battles generally involve parties who are both
the legal and natural parents of a child, equal before the law with regard to
203
their rights and responsibilities to the child. These questions are resolved
200

See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
The validity of surrogacy agreements and the constitutionality of surrogacy legislation has been
examined by at least a third of the states’ courts. California courts have, perhaps, been the most active
on surrogacy concerns. . See generally 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:22, supra note 173.
202 . A.L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of status as legal or natural parents in contested
surrogacy births, 77 A. L. R.5TH 567 (2000).
203 But see the earlier discussion regarding child custody issues and non-parents when gay coparents dissolve their relationships. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
201
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by determining which parent should retain custody by applying a “best in204
terests of the child” standard. Gestational surrogacy disputes may require
the answer to a preliminary and more fundamental question, “Who is the
parent?”
Courts typically employ one of three tests, or a combination thereof, to
determine parentage in surrogacy cases: the intent of the parties, the genet205
ics of the parents and child, or the identity of the birthing parent.
The
California Supreme Court employed the intent-of-the-parties approach in
the seminal case of Johnson v. Calvert, finding that the intended mother and
father were both the natural and legal parents of a child born using their egg
206
and sperm, and rejecting the surrogate’s maternal claim based on birth.
The Johnson approach was subsequently applied in In re Marriage of Buzzanca, a California case in which neither of the intended parents nor the
surrogate mother were genetically related to a child who was conceived
207
through the donation of both anonymous eggs and sperm. Rather than a
dispute between the surrogate and the intended parents, Buzzanca involved
the divorce of the intended parents. The intended father denied paternity
and the intended mother sought child support from her soon-to-be ex208
husband. Rejecting the trial court’s finding that the child had no lawful
parents, the Buzzanca Court ruled that the intended parents were the lawful
209
parents even though they were not genetically related to the child.
Employing a different approach, an Ohio court relied on genetics over
birth and intent. In ruling that the natural (and intended) parents were the
legal parents, the court left open the possibility that a claim by the birth
mother would be upheld only if the natural parents disclaimed the child and
210
the surrogate desired the child.
Other courts also focus on genetics and
gestation, holding that the genetic connection to a child is of paramount
211
importance in determining legal maternity. In J.R. v Utah, a federal court
declared unconstitutional Utah’s surrogacy law, which was designed to discourage surrogacy arrangements by mandating that a surrogate mother is
212
the only legal mother recognized under state law.
The court found that
Utah’s statutorily-based refusal to recognize the natural parents as the legal
parents of their own child, born through a surrogacy arrangement, violated
213
the fundamental rights of the intended and natural parents to procreate.
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

. L.J. HARRIS, L. E. TEITELBAUM & J. CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 622-60(2005).
Campbell, supra note 202, at 567; L. H. Dietz, Parent and Child, 59 AM. JUR. 2D §3 (2007).
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (1993).
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (4th Dist. 1998).
Id. at 1412.
Id.
Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994).
See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001).
J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002).
Id. at 1290.
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How a gay man or any person other than a married commissioning couple would fare in a dispute with a gestational surrogate in Florida depends,
in large part, on how the court would approach its analysis of parentage,
which provisions of Florida law it would favor, and the degree to which the
surrogacy contract serves an evidentiary function in the proceedings. It
would also depend on the manner in which the case is presented to the
court: as a claim by an intended and natural single parent, as an issue in a
divorce action, or even as a petition by a surrogate who, although biologically unrelated to the child, seeks judicial relief from maternal responsibilities due to a default by a natural parent. Establishing paternity and disestablishing maternity would be core to any decisions an intended gay parent.
b. Establishing Paternity
The most probable litigation scenario in Florida would be sparked by a
gestational surrogate’s unwillingness to surrender physical control of the
child, prompting the intended father to file suit to establish paternity and
seek custody. Thus, the first issue for the court, absent the unenforceable
surrogacy contract, would be to identify the child’s father. How a Florida
court approaches paternity may vary depending upon whether the surrogate
214
is married at the time of the child’s birth. Florida’s parentage laws provide that if the mother is married at the time of a child’s birth, her husband
is presumptively the father of the child, “unless paternity has been deter215
mined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.” When a married
woman gives birth, Florida law requires her husband to be named as the
216
father on the child’s birth certificate. This presumption of marital fatherhood is “one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known to the law,”
217
but it is rebuttable by either the husband or the wife’s paramour.
State law also establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a child conceived within wedlock by artificial or in vitro insemination, by a donated

214 A husband may also be presumed to be the father if the marital couple engaged in premarital
relations during the possible period of conception. See, e.g., Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Serv. v.
Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1944); Blitch v. Blitch,
341 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
215 FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(a) (2006). See also, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Preston v. Cummings,
871 So. 2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (finding that marital parties have a legal duty to support
child born of the marriage); G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (protecting legal
father’s rights against third party claims); Hess v. Hess, 466 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
(finding that presumption of legitimacy may prevent child’s mother from contesting legal father’s parental rights).
216 FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(a) (2006).
217 Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d 163, 163 (Fla. 1944); see also Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs.
v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993) (emphasizing best interests of the child in disputes between legal
and natural fathers).
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egg, or by preembryo is the child of the husband and wife, “provided that
both parties have consented in writing” to the reproductive technology
218
used, except in the case of gestational surrogacy. If the contract of gestational surrogacy is void and unenforceable, the gestational-surrogacy exception to the irrebuttable presumption should not be recognized by the
court. However, it is common practice in gestational surrogacy arrangements to require husbands of married surrogates to sign a separate denial of
consent to the reproductive technique in order to affirmatively void the irrebuttable presumption that the resulting child is conceived by the married
219
couple.
In the event that a gestational surrogacy arrangement soured in
Florida, the husband’s written denial of consent independent of the surrogacy contract and standing alone, should provide evidence sufficient to undermine the irrebuttable presumption in favor of the husband, allowing the
natural or biological father to advance his paternity interests against the
surrogate’s husband now-rebuttable presumption that he is the father of the
child.
Florida law allows “any man who has reason to believe that he is the
220
father of a child” to bring an action in circuit court to determine paternity.
The state, ever interested in securing child support from putative fathers,
221
also welcomes affidavits and voluntary acknowledgments of fatherhood.
Thus, a father in a failed gestational surrogacy arrangement could simply
file an affidavit or voluntarily acknowledge paternity. If the surrogate disputes his fatherhood, as she may under Florida law, state law provides that a
court may, on its own motion, order scientific testing of the mother, child,
222
and any alleged fathers to establish paternity. Courts may also order sci218

FLA. STAT. § 742.11(a-b) (2006).
See Sanger, supra note 163, at 80, n. 60 (reporting on Baby M, Rick Whitehead signed denial
of consent).
220 FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (2006). The rule in Privette, however, permits the legal father (the husband of the surrogate) to be heard and would require the court to establish that the paternity claim is
factually accurate, brought in good faith, supported by reliable evidence, and that the child’s better
interests would be served if the child is determined not to be the legitimate child of the marriage. Dep’t
of Health and Rehab.Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1993). In Daniel, the Florida Supreme
Court distinguished Privette as a question of legitimacy over paternity. Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d
1253, 1255 (Fla. 1997). See, also, R. Thomas Corbin and Rana Holz, Distinguishing Legitimacy From
Paternity: Has Legitimacy Become A Label Without Substance Under Florida Law? 73 FLA. B. J. 57
(1999).
221 The state charges the Department of Revenue with seeking out putative fathers, establishing
their paternity, requiring them to pay support to the child’s mother, and in some cases, repay the state for
any child welfare and medical assistance provided. FLA. STAT. §§ 409.256(e) (2006). Most of the cases
involving scientific paternity testing stem from Department of Revenue actions. See, e.g. Dep’t of
Revenue ex rel. Freckleton v. Goulbourne, 648 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Dep’t of Revenue ex
rel. Gardner v. Long, 937 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Signed voluntary acknowledgements of
paternity are specially favored by Florida law, and enjoy a favored status if uncontested in that after 60
days, the acknowledgement creates a limited rebuttable presumption of paternity that can only be challenged on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. FLA. STAT. § 742.10(1&4) (2006).
222 FLA. STAT. § 742.12 (1) (2006).
219
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entific testing at the request of a party who provides a sworn statement or
written declaration alleging paternity “setting forth facts establishing a rea223
sonable possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties.”
This latter provision provides little force to the intended father in a gestational surrogacy arrangement as he cannot substantiate “the requisite sexual
contact” between the parties.
Also problematic for the intended father in a failed gestational surrogacy arrangement is a statutory provision that might treat the intended father as nothing more than a sperm donor with no rights to the child. Florida
Statute s. 742.14 states that the “donor of any . . . sperm . . . other than the
commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption
agreement under s. 63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights
224
and obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting children.” A
Florida court might cut off the intended father’s paternity claim, reasoning
that without the contract the father is merely a sperm donor, much like the
225
biological father in Lamaritata v. Lucas.
In Lamaritata, the court ruled that the biological father was not a parent and rejected his claim that he and the biological mother were a commis226
sioning couple under Florida’s gestational surrogacy statute. In that case,
however, the biological father had signed a contract agreeing that if childbirth resulted, he would have no parental rights or obligations. He affirmatively surrendered his parental rights; thus, the biological father was more
like a sperm donor than an intended father. Of note in the Lamaritata decision is the court’s recognition that the statute fails to define “sperm donor.”
Relying on the text of the contract, which refers to the biological father only
as a “donor,” and sperm as “the only donation required of him,” and the
state statute, the court concludes that the biological father is only a sperm
227
donor and not a parent.
Whether a court would come to a similar conclusion in the case of an
unenforceable surrogacy contract depends on whether the court would be
willing to distinguish the affirmative waiver of parental rights by the sperm
donor in Lamaritata from the biological father’s intent to parent as evidenced — albeit, not enforced – by the surrogacy contract and, the surrogate’s husband’s denial of consent, in the case of a married surrogate. A
court that accepts this distinction would be likely to permit the intended
228
father to substantiate his paternity through scientific testing. But gaining

223

FLA. STAT. § 742.12 (2) (2006).
FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2006).
225 Hersey v. State, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
226 Id. at 318-19.
227 Id.
228 Under Florida Statute s. 742.011 (2006), “any man who has reason to believe that he is the
father of a child . . . may bring proceedings in the circuit court.”
224
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paternal recognition would be only half of the battle for an intended parent
facing an unenforceable surrogacy contract. The other half of the fight
would be to deny the surrogate any rights or recognition as the child’s
mother, and this may be the more difficult hurdle for a gay father.
c. Dis-establishing Maternity
Historically, parentage questions raised only paternity issues—who is
the father? Florida’s law, like those of many states, has not evolved to consider the possibility that a child born to a woman may not be that woman’s
biological offspring. Florida does not even define “mother” in its parentage
229
In fact, the clearest statement of Florida’s view on maternity
statutes.
dates back to 1934, when the Florida Supreme Court found, “A wife is not
permitted to deny the parentage of children born during wedlock. She cannot repudiate their legitimacy. That right belongs only to the father, because maternity is never uncertain. She may only contest the identity of the
230
child.” Florida law does not address the status of the mother nor does it
explicitly establish that there is a presumption --rebuttable or irrebuttable -that the birth mother is the legal mother of a child. However, public records
laws mandate that a record of live birth or birth certificate “must be as to
the child’s birth parents unless and until an application for a new birth re231
cord is made” under the adoption statute.
An unanswered question in this situation is whether a court would
even entertain proceedings to determine “maternity” when there is no question that an identifiable woman gave birth to the child in question. While
Florida law addresses assumptions of parentage with regard to married couples, that a child born to during marriage is presumed to be the child of both
the mother and father, it does not explicitly make a presumption that a child
born to a woman is that woman’s child. But Florida law requires that information on a birth certificate be given as to the child’s “birth parents”
(even if there is a pending adoption), which may further complicate future
232
proceedings to have the surrogate removed as the child’s mother. Finally,
Florida law specifically provides only for paternity proceedings; it makes
no mention in any statute of determinations of motherhood.
Whether a court would read the jurisdictional statute that charges circuit courts with making paternity determinations as granting jurisdiction
over maternity issues depends largely on the reading of the individual judge
to whom the case is assigned. A strict reading of the law would forestall
229 But see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(4) (2001) (defining mother as the biological
mother of a child born out of wedlock.)
230 Gossett v. Ullendorff, 154 So. 177, 181 (Fla. 1934) (distinguishing between ruling in probate
case that widow who disclaimed children had unclean hands).
231 FLA. STAT. § 382.013(1)(g) (2006).
232 Id.
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nearly every challenge to maternity in Florida. The statute permits only
three parties to bring paternity proceedings: 1) a woman who is pregnant or
has a child, 2) any man who has reason to believe that he is the father of a
233
child, or 3) any child. The statute also defines when paternity proceedings may be brought as “when paternity has not been established by law or
234
otherwise.” A court may find that a man simply cannot use the law to
challenge the legal interests of a woman who, although not genetically related to the child, is the only identifiable woman that could serve as a
“mother” to the child even if the natural father has already established his
paternity. A court might also take a more liberal approach, recognizing that
the law is outmoded and finding that the fundamental rights of a parent—
the father—are at risk. Based on that reasoning, and armed with evidence
in the form of the gestational contract that strongly suggests that the surrogate is not the mother of the child, a court may entertain a maternity proceeding and require a woman to establish her genetic relationship to the
child.
The legal culture of Florida suggests, however, that courts are more
likely to read a statute strictly, and rule in a manner that favors the “traditional” family, even in the face of non-traditional circumstances. If the egg
donor is identifiable, a Florida court may be more willing to grant parentage
to the biological parents of the child because a traditional family would
exist. However, if the egg donor is anonymous and the natural father is a
gay man, public policy preferences would likely result in the Baby M compromise. The surrogate, even though genetically unrelated, would be identified as the mother along with the natural father and a custody determination would ensue. The result would look more like a preplanned adoption
or traditional surrogacy. Ultimately, a Florida court would like rely on a
“best interests of the child” standard and insure that a child has both a
mother and father.
The manner in which a gestational surrogacy case reaches the court
will also determine the type of analysis a Florida court might use. In Ten235
nessee, an unmarried couple decided to begin a family. Using the eggs of
an anonymous donor and the sperm of the intended father, the pre-embryos
were implanted in the surrogate who was also the intended mother. She
gave birth to triplets and when the unmarried couple’s relationship dissolved, the birth mother/surrogate brought a paternity action against the
natural father. His defense rested on the fact that the birth mother was not
the genetic parent and therefore, not the legal parent with standing to file
the paternity action. The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that their

233
234
235

FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (2006).
Id.
In re C.K.G., C.A.G., & C.L.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005).
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state laws simply did not “contemplate many of the scenarios made possible
236
by recent developments in reproductive technology.” The court rejected
the natural father’s argument, finding that the birth mother was the legal
parent and awarding custody to both the natural father and legal mother,
237
with the mother having primary custody.
This discussion of gestational surrogacy suggests that lesbians and gay
men who enter into nonbinding and unenforceable gestational surrogacy
contracts in Florida should consider several actions to protect their interests
in the child. First, the potential for disputes over paternity are exacerbated
when the surrogate is married. Intended parents would be best served in
238
seeking out an unmarried and experienced surrogate.
Second, an intended father should establish paternity as soon as the pregnancy is confirmed by filing an affidavit acknowledging paternity under Florida Statute
s. 742.10(1) (2006). In doing so, any challenge to the intended father’s
claim closes sixty days after the affidavit is filed, which is well before the
239
child is born. Blood tests in utero can also provide early evidence of paternity that may support a declaration of paternity even before the child is
born.
In order to avoid a court declaration that the intended father is merely
a sperm donor under Florida law, the intended father may want to supplement the gestational surrogacy contract with a preplanned adoption agreement, which would be recognized under Florida law. While the preplanned
adoption agreement would place the gay father back into the predicament of
possibly sharing custody of his child with the surrogate, not having the
agreement could result in a finding that the father is merely a sperm donor
entitled to no rights under law.
Finally, the intended parents would be well-served by seeking scientific paternity and maternity testing of the fetus as early in the pregnancy as
safely possible. Results that show that the surrogate is not the natural
mother may later serve to persuade an open-minded court that the surrogate
does not have standing to challenge paternity and to claim custody. They
may also serve as the basis for a pre-birth finding of paternity and maternity. Ultimately, the existence of the results might just simply dissuade the
surrogate from contesting the agreement.
In sum, a gay man or lesbian takes risks in entering into a gestational
surrogacy contract in that it will likely prove unenforceable in state court.

236

Id. at 721.
Id. at 733.
238 Note, however, that there is nothing that would prevent an unmarried surrogate from marrying
during the pregnancy, which would effectively establish the legal presumption, albeit rebuttable, that her
husband is the father.
239 The only challenges that may be raised after 60 days are those related to fraud, duress or material mistake of fact. FLA. STAT. § 742.10(4) (2006).
237

512

FIU Law Review

[4:473

On balance, however, the risks might be less than in a traditional surrogacy
or preplanned adoption agreement in Florida. When gestational surrogacy
arrangements are done, prospective parents are well-advised to work
closely with legal counsel who have experience in this specialized practice
and to select a gestational surrogate who is experienced and known to be
reliable.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has closely examined the three major ways in which
gays and lesbians in Florida can become parents within the contours of
Florida law: adoption, artificial insemination and surrogacy. But as the
historical backdrop to Florida’s adoption ban suggests, there is great resistance by both politicians and the courts to embrace the liberalization of
“family” in Florida. Roadblocks against lesbigay parenting in Florida are
likely to remain on the public agenda until the ban on “homosexual” adoptions is reversed either by the state legislature or by the courts. Some in the
state legislature have unsuccessfully introduced legislation to modify or
240
reverse the ban. For example, legislation introduced in anticipation of the
2008 Florida legislative session would permit adoptions by gay men and
241
lesbians in very limited circumstances. Specifically, the bill would lift the
blanket ban on adoptions and permit adoptions by gays and lesbians when a
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child, who must have
resided with the person seeking to adopt, recognizes that person as the
242
child’s parent and the adoption serves the best interest of the child.
A
lesbigay adoption could also be granted if the person seeking to adopt had

240

S.B. 752, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995); H.B. 349, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995); H.B. 1461 Reg. Sess. (Fla.

1993).
241 “A Bill to Be Entitled An Act Relating to Adoption,” H 45, introduced July 31, 2007, by Representative Mary Brandenburg. Parallel legislation was introduced in the Florida Senate. See, “A Bill to
Be Entitled An Act Relating to Adoption,” SB 200, introduced on September 6, 2007, by Senator Nan
Rich. At the time of writing, the House bill had been referred to the Committee on Healthy Families and
the Senate bill had been referred to the Committee on Children, Family and Elder Affairs, which was
conducting public hearings across the state.
242 Id. The proposal would amend Florida Statute s. 63.042(3) (2006) by revising language, and
adding subsections (a) and (b):

(3) (a) A person is not eligible to adopt under this section if that person is a homosexual, except as
provided in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c).
(b) A person who is homosexual is eligible to adopt if a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
1. The child has resided with the person proposing to adopt the child;
2. The child recognizes the person proposing to adopt the child as the child’s parent; and
3. The best interest of the child will be served by approving the adoption. In determining the best
interest of the child, the court shall consider whether granting the child permanency in the home of the
person proposing to adopt the child is more beneficial to the child’s development and psychological
needs than maintaining the child in temporary placement.
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been named as guardian of a minor child by the child’s deceased parents,
and if the last surviving parent had expressed an intention through petition
243
under Florida’s standby guardianship statute, recorded declaration under
244
the state’s preneed guardianship law, or by will or codicil that the guard245
ian be eligible to adopt.
Such a weakening in the adoption ban may establish the “irrationality”
necessary to mount an effective equal protection challenge under state law.
For now, however, the old nursery rhyme, “[f]irst comes love, then comes
marriage, then comes Mary pushing a baby carriage,” does not describe the
lives of gay men and lesbians in Florida. While love certainly comes first
in contemporary gay relationships, it is likely to be followed by the baby
carriage with the hope, that someday in the future their relationships will be
fully recognized by the state. Lesbigay parenting may ultimately transform
public thinking on gay marriage as issues that gave rise to the common law
structures of property and intestacy find their way in American courts in the
context of lesbigay family matters. If the best interests of the child truly
remain at the core of Florida’s legal values, a child who is the son or daughter of gay men or lesbians deserves nothing less than the children of heterosexual couples.

243
244
245

FLA. STAT. § 744.304 (2006).
FLA. STAT. § 744.3046 (2006).
Id. The proposal would amend Florida Statute s. 63.042(3) (2006) to add (c):

(c) A person who is homosexual is eligible to adopt if both parents of the child are deceased and
the person proposing to adopt the child is the guardian of the person of the minor as a result of:
1. A petition that has been filed by the parent or parents under s. 744.304, that names the person
proposing to adopt the child as the guardian of the person of the minor, and that expresses the intent that the guardian be eligible to adopt the child;
2. A declaration that has been made by both parents or the last surviving parent, that meets the requirements of s. 744.3046, that names the person proposing to adopt the child as the guardian of
the person of the minor, and that expresses the intent that the guardian be eligible to adopt the
child; or
3. A designation in the last surviving spouse’s will which names the person proposing to adopt the
child as the guardian of the person of the minor and expresses the intent that the guardian be eligible to adopt the child.

